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F R O M  1 9 9 2  T O  2 0 0 5 , six factors
contributed to the U.S. housing boom:
mortgage rates decreased to generational
lows; financing innovations lowered
homeownership costs; home listings were
centralized on the Internet (to minimize
transaction costs); lenders gave priority to
minority homeownership; demographic
influences strengthened housing demand;
and real estate was perceived as a safe
haven for household wealth compared to
the stock market, which offered poor
investment returns. 
These factors, combined with record-
volume home sales, increased home appre-
ciation, record homeownership rates, and




Lenders and investors in the
South Florida real estate 
market are currently caught up
in a game of “musical chairs,”
hedging against the 
impending bust.
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have lead many economists to the conclu-
sion that there is a national housing boom.
Industry economists recognize that price
gains have been unusually strong in recent
years because of robust housing demand
and increasingly stringent supply con-
straints in some areas, which have boosted
price appreciation above the rate of
income growth. A stable relationship
between income and house prices over
time suggests the absence of a nationwide
housing bubble, especially when placed in
the context of a national unemployment
rate below 6 percent, extremely low mort-
gage rates, and the acceleration of a broad-
er economy.
Federal Reserve chairman Alan
Greenspan has said, “The national hous-
ing market is better understood as a collec-
tion of small, local housing markets.”
According to Greenspan, local conditions
dominate home prices; therefore, any bub-
bles that might emerge would tend to be
local. It is possible that valuation bubbles
exist in regional housing markets, where
homes are selling above list prices, buyers
are quickly flipping properties, and prices
continually gain even as unsold inventories
rise. Is that what is happening in South
Florida? 
A real estate bubble about to burst
could take two forms. First, home prices
could decline due to a substantial imbal-
ance between supply and demand.
Symptoms of such an imbalance would
include all or some of the following: a sup-
ply overhang; anemic demand leading to a
substantial and growing inventory of
unsold homes; or a surge in new construc-
tion in an area of weak housing demand.
In other words, home prices decline when
prices have gone up counter to underlying
fundamentals. Second, home prices could
exceed what the average family in a given
geographic area can “afford.”
A real estate market bubble is analo-
gous to any other asset valuation bubble.
In fact, the recent tech bubble has led
many analysts to search a variety of asset
classes for signs of another bubble. An
asset will be subject to a valuation bubble
under the following three conditions:
when the uncertainty of future returns on
the asset increases; when the transaction
costs of acquiring or selling the asset
decrease (inviting speculative buying); and
when the holding period of the asset
becomes shorter than historical norms.
How do these warning indicators apply to
the South Florida condo market?
During the most recent real estate
boom, South Florida has been character-
ized by a marked contradiction: Miami,
with its large immigrant and refugee pop-
ulation, is the poorest per capita metropol-
itan region in country, yet the region also
has one of the most expensive housing
markets. In 1997, the average price for a
new condo in Miami-Dade County was
$199,000. By 2004 it had risen to
R E V I E W 4 5
$308,000, a 53 percent price appreciation.
Existing condominiums also enjoyed a
rapid price appreciation. For example, in
2004 the average sales price for an existing
condominium in Miami-Dade was
$194,000 compared to $98,000 in 1997,
an almost 97 percent increase. Housing
prices in Hialeah, a Miami suburb, shot up
26 percent in 2004, making this gentrified
middle-income community one of the
nation’s hottest housing markets. Housing
prices in the Miami area were widely
expected to moderate in 2005. However,
in the second quarter of 2005, all of the
top three national areas in terms of home
price appreciation were in South Florida.
According to the National Association of
Realtors, some areas in South Florida have
seen 46 percent price appreciation in the
past year, compared to a national price
appreciation of 9 percent for the same
period. The average home price in the sec-
ond quarter of 2005 in Miami was
$315,700, up 28 percent from a year prior. 
Given South Florida’s rapid price
appreciation, the question is to what
extent the supply-demand fundamentals
support the price increases. The determi-
nants of demand for housing include
household income, the cost of homeown-
ership, and demographic growth. The sup-
ply of housing is also determined by con-
struction costs, the price of a house on the
secondary market, and the inventory of
homes. For instance, following the 2004
hurricane season, construction costs in
South Florida increased by roughly 9 per-
cent. This translated to an actual increase
for new products closer to 15 percent. In
addition, a lack of inventory and the
resulting demographic displacement stem-
ming from the 2004 hurricane season on
the west coast of south Florida drove up
prices on the east coast. 
In Miami-Dade County in 2004, the
average price of a new condo unit was
$308,000 ($194,000 for an existing unit),
or 7.7 times the region’s median household
income of approximately $40,000.
Evidently, the Miami condo market is not
aimed at local buyers; rather it targets the
many high net-worth European and South
American equity investors who seek to
capitalize on the region’s housing boom.
Europeans, in particular, have been taking
advantage of the drop in value of the euro,
while Latin Americans have been motivat-
ed by a stable equity alternative to their
domestic equity markets. In many condo-
minium developments, international buy-
ers represent half of all buyers. Since these
purchases are often cash deals, the local
housing economy is less susceptible to
Fannie Mae’s tightening underwriting
standards. 
There appears to be an excess supply
of new and pipeline units, although exact
numbers are unknown. Based upon pub-
lic and private sources, we estimate that
the number of new condo units delivered
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in 2003 in Miami-Dade was 8,000, while
the number of units delivered in 2004
was 9,000. Approximately 50,000 condo
units are either planned or under con-
struction in 2005. With an absorption
rate of at best 12,000 units per year, it is
hard to justify these numbers, especially
when condo conversions in Miami-Dade
will produce another 13,000 units. Some
argue that there is nothing to worry about,
because low interest rates are fueling
demand in excess of supply. What this
bullish analysis ignores is the large number
of speculative investors who will ultimate-
ly have to sell their units or add them to
the rental market. According to some esti-
mates, between 40 percent and 80 percent
of pre-sale buyers in Miami are investor-
speculators. The result is a valuation bub-
ble driven by non-resident demand, fueled
by low mortgage rates and exacerbated by
aggressive lending practices.
S C E N A R I O S
A condo bubble is a deviation of the mar-
ket price of a housing unit from its
underlying fundamental value. The fun-
damental value is a combination of the
physical fabric of the building, environ-
mental amenities, location, public servic-
es, marketing image, occupancy rate, and
the availability of financing. But identify-
ing a bubble is neither easy nor exact. It is
possible to compare recent price appreci-
ation with the behavior of housing mar-
kets at similar stages of past cycles, or to
assess whether house prices are high rela-
tive to their rental value. 
Rising mortgage rates would impact
the Miami condo market by reducing
demand for non-cash deals. Moreover,
because Miami has low income growth
and an increasing supply of unsold
condo units in inventory, a price adjust-
ment seems inevitable. A good compari-
son to Miami’s condo market is Las
Vegas, where price appreciation has been
as high as 45 percent per year. When the
“flippers” could not sell, they tried to
rent the units to cover carrying costs,
causing rents to decrease. As a result,
owner-investors were forced to sell and
prices declined by 1.2 percent.
Another scenario for Miami is similar
to a margin call. Some experts predict that
in approximately two years, when the
unsold condo inventory reaches 10,000
units, “flippers” will be forced to sell and
developers will have to match their prices.
This situation occurred in South Florida in
the early 1980s, when thousands of vacant
and foreclosed condos were sold in bulk by
foreclosing banks. 
Some experts estimate that the South
Florida market is overpriced by as much as
a third. If true, this means net losses for
investors, or in an alternative “best-case”
scenario, prices merely sliding sideways for
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three to five years. However, it is hard to
imagine such a best-case scenario due to
the large number of speculators in the
market. Since there are so many specula-
tors with no corresponding buyers, it is
possible that in the event of a downturn
investors who have put down 5 percent to
10 percent to reserve a condo unit that will
be built in 18 months will simply walk
away or sue to prevent developers from
taking their escrow deposits. Such suits for
the enjoinment of the release of escrow
deposits could be argued on a number of
fronts. If depositor/investors argue that
they were sold the units based on estimat-
ed stated economic returns, state and fed-
eral securities laws might prevent the
developers from taking the escrow
deposits. Alternatively, depositor/investors
could have a common law fraud claim
against the developers, although this is less
likely given the limiting language stated in
the reservation (deposit) agreements. In
any event, the exodus of investor/deposi-
tors would leave developers swamped with
unsold units and could result in non-
recourse developers walking away from
their projects.
B U S T
If the condo-driven real estate market takes
a downturn, the most immediate impact
would be that some planned condo proj-
ects would not get built, as construction
lenders tightened their underwriting stan-
dards. For those projects that have not
secured construction or permanent financ-
ing, tighter pre-sale requirements would
prohibit new projects being financed.
Even projects that met initial pre-sale
requirements might no longer be econom-
ically feasible. This would be particularly
important because many developers take
their profits on the unsold units in inven-
tory. Many purchase-sale contracts that
were executed two years ago do not reflect
the same price margins for the developer
due to increases in construction costs. 
For projects that remain economic,
there are additional impediments to start-
ing and completing construction. First,
permanent lenders would raise the equity
requirements for projects. Institutional
structured equity financing, or mezzanine
financing, which thrives in today’s boom
market, would no longer be as readily
accessible. This would be partially due to
the risk involved as subordinate mort-
gagees in an uncertain market. So, for
projects that had secured construction
financing contingent upon a take-out, it
would not be possible in a downturn to
secure a take-out given relative loan-to-
cost and loan-to-value ratios. In cases
where a project is not built due to eco-
nomic impracticability, it is not entirely a
loss for the developer, as the permitted
land may bear a substantial residual value,
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which serves as a floor for valuation in the
event of a downturn. 
What about units that are currently
constructed and occupied? We assume that
any downturn in the market would be
immediately characterized as a point in
time when the secondary market is flood-
ed with speculative buyers attempting to
flip their properties. In this event, specula-
tive owners would initially attempt to rent
their units, in order to generate cash flow.
The market psychology at this point
would still be one of optimism in the face
of an inability to realize capital gains. 
With time, the oversupply of rental
units would drive rents downward. It can
be assumed that property taxes will be con-
stant as a function of assessed value relative
to the absolute decline in fair market value.
A dramatic decline in rents would cause
speculators to struggle to meet debt serv-
ice, tax, and insurance requirements. It
should not be forgotten that in the midst
of the 2004 hurricane season, all of Florida
is a state of record high insurance premi-
ums. It is at this juncture, if they have not
already done so, that the speculators would
put their properties on the market for sale.
Subsequently, an over-supply of units on
the market would dramatically drive the
market value of the units below the
investor’s break points. At this juncture, a
true bust would occur. 
South Florida has long built its econo-
my on the foundation of the real estate
industry. In fact, boom and bust has been
in the Miami lexicon since the mid-1920s.
However, the complexities of externalized
capital flowing into an inherently local
market have placed the South Florida mar-
ket in a precarious position. The relative
lack of guidance in the market is exacer-
bated by irrational market exuberance and
an industry campaign of misinformation. 
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